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Abstract
Individual quotas are a dominant instrument in the management of common pool
renewable resources like fisheries. However, there is concern about the basic effective-
ness of quota regulation due to widespread non-compliance. In this paper we develop a
model of enforcement in a quota regulated renewable resource industry and consider a
case with significant non-compliance, and with exogenous constraints on fines and en-
forcement budget. We propose a reform of the enforcement system by introducing self
reporting of excess extraction and (explicit) differentiation of inspection rates based
on compliance history. We show that the proposed reform increases the effectiveness
of quota management and allows the regulator to implement a wider range of aggre-
gate extraction targets than under the traditional enforcement system. This is shown
without violating the inspection budget constraint or the fine constraint, and while
ensuring an efficient allocation of aggregate catch.
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1 Introduction
Much work has been devoted to exploring optimal management of common pool re-
newable resources like fisheries, including the optimal design of quota-based systems.
There has also been an increasing focus on compliance issues. The productivity growth
in production technologies has increased both the importance of ensuring effective en-
forcement and the incentives of firms to violate the regulations.
Currently, regulatory non-compliance is widespread in world fisheries. Recent es-
timates suggest that illegal and unreported catches constitute on average about 20%
of reported catches in world fisheries (Agnew et al., 2009). The estimates vary both
across regions, fish species, and over time, but the number is nonetheless considerable.
Quotas are typically enforced by use of random inspections. Inspection rates may be
higher for vessels perceived by inspectors to be more likely to violate quotas, but such
differentiation in inspection rates is not a formal part of the enforcement system.1 If
violations are detected, violators are prosecuted and punished (fined). Reducing quota
violations requires tougher enforcement or tougher punishment. The latter is equivalent
to increasing fines under the traditional enforcement system. However, both increased
enforcement efforts and higher fines may be politically infeasible due to budgetary and
legal constraints.2 This could leave resource managers in a situation with substantial
problems of quota violations, but without the ability to take further actions to reduce
violations.
The objective of this paper is to propose a reform of the traditional enforcement
system that increases the effectiveness of quota regulation while satisfying budgetary
and legal constraints. Our enforcement model contains two important extensions of
the traditional quota enforcement model. The first extension is that firms may self
report catches in excess of quotas. Upon doing so the firm pays a given amount per
self reported unit (a reduced “fine”). This makes it legal to exceed quotas as long as
the correct excess quantity is reported and paid for. The second model extension is to
introduce differentiated inspections based on the firms’ compliance history. Firms that
are inspected and found to violate quotas, that is, exceeded their quotas without fully
self reporting this, are moved into an inspection group with a higher inspection rate
for a given period of time. In addition, detected violators are prosecuted and punished
1To our knowledge, differentiated inspection rates are not a formal part of the enforcement system in any
fishery. However, we know that at least in some fisheries inspections are to some degree targeted on vessels
that based on their compliance record are perceived to have a higher likelihood of violating regulations.
2Fines are typically constrained by the principle that the punishment should be proportional to the
crime, which restricts the use of higher fines to combat illegal fishing. Furthermore, substantial increases in
enforcement costs are often politically infeasible due to budgetary constraints.
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(fined). For a given maximum fine (punishment level) we show that this enforcement
system always can ensure a given aggregate catch level more efficiently than the stan-
dard enforcement system (irrespective of how inspection rates are differentiated in this
system). Furthermore, the enforcement system increases enforcement effectiveness.
Therefore, for a given fine level and inspection budget, the proposed system generally
achieves a larger range of target aggregate catch levels than the traditional enforce-
ment system. An example and numerical results are provided that demonstrate these
improvements, as well as possible limitations of the proposed enforcement system.
Both self reporting of violations and differentiated inspections based on compliance
history have been studied in the regulatory economics literature. From the strand of
this literature that studies enforcement systems based on self reporting, we know that
such systems are commonly used in environmental regulation (Russell, 1990) and have
proven to be effective in many cases where high compliance rates are achieved even
though both sanctions and inspection rates are low (Livernois & McKenna, 1999).
The self-reporting literature suggests that higher compliance rates may be the re-
sult of more efficient targeting of inspection resources, which is made possible by self
reporting. A number of papers in this literature considers incorporation of self report-
ing into a fine-based environmental regulation system, showing that this could increase
compliance and efficiency (Malik, 1993; Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Livernois & McKenna,
1999; Innes, 1999, 2001; Macho-Stadler & Pe´rez-Castrillo, 2006). The main advantage
is that self reporting allows the regulator to increase compliance by focusing control
resources on agents that do not self report violations (Kaplow & Shavell, 1994; Ma-
lik, 1993; Innes, 1999).3 Another advantage is that self reporting may allow regulated
agents to reduce their avoidance costs (Innes, 2001). On the other hand, the enforce-
ment system must give agents incentives to self report, for example by reducing the
fine for self reported relative to unreported violations(Livernois & McKenna, 1999).
Another strand of literature suggests that high compliance rates combined with
low sanction rates could be the result of what Heyes & Rickman (1999) refer to as
regulatory dealing (Harrington, 1988; Greenberg, 1984; Heyes & Rickman, 1999). The
basic idea is that firms are given lenient treatment in some situations where they do
not comply (reduced or no sanctions) in exchange for increased compliance in others.
Harrington (1988) suggests a system with two enforcement groups. Firms found to vio-
late regulations in the current period are placed in an enforcement group with tougher
sanctions next period. He shows that firms who do not have incentives to comply under
undifferentiated sanctioning and inspection rates, can be induced to comply under the
3In the environmental literature, compliance is usually a binary choice (to comply with or violate regu-
lations). Hence, if one self reports, there is no reason why such report is untruthful.
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differentiated system when in the tough sanctioning group. The reason is that firms in
this group have an additional incentive to comply with regulations, namely the reward
of being transferred to the low sanction group next period if compliant.
Both the self reporting and regulatory dealing mechanisms for increasing compli-
ance suggested in the literature, are based on incentives generated by the enforcement
system. This makes them relevant when developing enforcement reforms that could
increase compliance with fisheries regulations.4
Our contribution to this literature is to introduce the well-known concepts of self
reporting, on the one hand, and differentiated inspections and sanctions, on the other,
into the management of a quota regulated natural resource. The policy implications
are that resource managers can increase the range of implementable aggregate catch
targets and ensure efficient allocation without increasing enforcement costs, by making
some simple modifications to the traditional quota enforcement system. In contrast
to many previous models of enforcement of environmental regulations (e.g. Kaplow &
Shavell, 1994; Malik, 1993; Innes, 1999), quota violations can take on a continuum of
values and hence require inspections to ensure truthfulness. Furthermore, we consider
the enforcement of an inefficiently allocated quota, where firms with heterogenous costs
are allocated a fixed share of the total quota. In this case, an efficient allocation of
catch shares is obtained if all firms exceed their quotas and self report their excess
catches. Consequently, it becomes more important to focus on inducing truthful self
reporting rather than obtaining full quota compliance. This contrasts recent result for
enforcement of environmental regulations by Macho-Stadler & Pe´rez-Castrillo (2006).
In the fisheries economics literature a number of studies investigate optimal en-
forcement of a regulated fishery given the traditional enforcement system (Sutinen &
Andersen, 1985; Milliman, 1986; Anderson & Lee, 1986), while others consider the
choice of regulatory instruments in the presence of non-compliance (Charles et al.,
1999; Chavez & Salgado, 2005). However, our approach of combining self reporting
and inspection differentiation to increase the effectiveness of a given inspection budget
is new to this literature.
4Other explanations for high compliance rates in environmental regulation when sanctions and inspection
rates are low have been suggested. One explanation is the risk of repercussions over financial and output
markets if violating environmental regulations, which affect firm profits (see e.g. Hamilton, 1995; Konar &
Cohen, 1997; Anton et al., 2004). If consumers or investors care about the firm’s environmental reputation,
their reaction to disclosures of non-compliance with environmental regulations could be costly to the firm,
which may explain higher compliance rates even though regulatory sanctions are small. Such effects may be
important in the case of large differentiated firms that consumers and investors can identify in the market,
but are presumably less important for smaller, undifferentiated firms that are not easily identified in the
market, such as those operating in many fishing industries. See also Helland (1998), Sandmo (2000), and
Short & Toffel (2008).
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Section 2 presents the basic model of the traditional quota enforcement system.
The model is specified for a fishery that is regulated with non-transferable quotas,
and the case of the fishery is used as an example throughout the paper. Section 3
introduces our proposed enforcement system based on self reporting and differentiated
inspection rates, and proves theoretically that the proposed system generally is more
efficient and more effective than the traditional enforcement system. Section 4 provides
a numerical example to illustrate the ideas. In this section functional forms are specified
and numerical simulations are used to show optimal enforcement under the traditional
enforcement system and under our proposed enforcement system, and to compare the
two under different requirements for regulatory intensity. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2 The Traditional Enforcement System
In this section we develop a model of a quota regulated fishing industry consisting of
n firms that harvest a fish stock. The regulator sets a total quota that is allocated in
equal shares to the n firms as non-tradable quotas. 5 The regulator can only detect
quota violations through costly inspections that allow him to observe firm level catches.
Ideally the objective of the regulator is to maximize sustainable aggregate industry
profit net of inspection costs. Under the traditional enforcement system, the regulator
has two instruments; the size of the total quota and the inspection rate. When a firm
is inspected and found to violate regulations, it can be fined. However, the maximum
fine is assumed exogenously given as the fine is constrained by the principle that the
punishment should be proportional to the crime (legal constraint). Hence, higher fines
cannot necessarily be imposed to reduce illegal fishing. Furthermore, there is a budget
constraint on control efforts that limits the inspection rate. This can be explained
by substantial increases in enforcement costs often being politically infeasible due to
budgetary constraints.
2.1 The Firms and the Fish Stock
Total harvest is subject to a resource constraint ∆Xt = F (Xt)− Yt, which states that
the change in the resource stock in period t equals the period’s stock growth, F (Xt),
minus the total harvest, Yt. To keep things simple we disregard transition dynamics
and assume that the regulator compares sustainable states. That is, regulator considers
5In real-world fisheries, many quota systems allow for some trade in quotas, but such trade is often highly
restricted.
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sustainable catch level (Y ) and stock (X) combinations that satisfy:
Y = F (X) (1)
with the objective of maximizing aggregate sustainable profit less inspection costs.6
In a sustainable equilibrium without quota regulations each firm in the industry
chooses the extraction level that maximizes its own profit conditional on the resource
stock:
pii = pyi − c(yi, αi, X) (2)
where p is the output price, yi is firm i’s harvest, and c(·) is a cost function that relates
harvest cost to harvest quantity and the size of the fish stock X. The cost parameter
αi is firm specific, which indicates that there are cost differences between the n firms.
Let y∗(αi, X) denote the optimal harvest level of a firm with cost parameter αi at a
given stock level. All differences between firms are captured in the cost parameter αi.
Hence, the industry is uniquely characterized by the distribution of cost parameters
g(α). Aggregate harvest is the sum of all firms’ catches, Y =
∑
i
y∗i . In steady state
aggregate harvest must equal stock growth in each period. This implies the following
steady-state relationship between aggregate harvest and stock:∑
i
y∗(αi, X) = F (X). (3)
A large resource stock will not only generate a large equilibrium aggregate catch
(F (X)) but also lower marginal extraction costs ( ∂
2c
∂y∂X < 0) and so sustainable combi-
nations of large stock and yield are preferable. However, without regulations productive
extractors with relatively low marginal extraction costs choose catch levels that result
in aggregate catch levels larger than the sustainable yield associated with this stock
(Y = F (X)). Hence, without regulations stocks are driven down and the sustainable
unregulated equilibrium is typically characterized by low yield and stock levels. In
certain cases, the stock can even be driven to extinction with an equilibrium yield of
zero. Regulations are introduced because of this externality in resource extraction.
The purpose of regulation is to reduce extraction below the uncoordinated level to
reach the preferred equilibrium.
6The model and results we present in the following generalize to the dynamic setting. However, while
this complicates derivations it does not as such affect results nor does it add real insights about the workings
of the suggested enforcement mechanism.
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2.2 The Regulator and Enforcement
Each firm is allocated a non-transferable quota q. The firm chooses whether to comply
with its quota, knowing that quota violation comes at the risk of being fined if the
violation is detected. The regulator can only observe the firms’ harvest levels by
conducting costly inspections of firms. The regulator is constrained by an inspection
budget that allows for a given number of inspections per period, m < n. Without
differentiation between firms, this results in an inspection rate of γ = mn < 1 for each
firm per period of time. The cost per inspection is cm. We assume that each firm
is inspected at most once per period, and that the inspection accurately reveals the
actual harvest level of the firm in that period. Hence, we abstract from the possibility
of firms making several fishing trips per period.
A fine up to a maximum of f can be imposed per unit harvested in excess of the
quota. The maximum fine is stipulated by exogenously given legislation and statutes,
and is assumed to be high enough to fully deter quota violations if applied with cer-
tainty. If a firm is inspected during a time period, we assume that all illegal landings are
observed (no inspection error). The regulator knows the cost function and the distri-
bution of cost parameters in the industry g(α), but does not know the individual firm’s
cost parameter αi. All n firms are allocated the same resource quota q =
Q
n , where Q
is the total allowable harvest.7 Under this system, firms choose harvest quantities to
maximize profits net of expected fine payments (cf. equation 2), i.e.:
y∗i (αi, q, γ,X) = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− γf (max(0, yi − qi))] (4)
A welfare maximizing regulator would seek to maximize total sustainable industry
profit net of enforcement costs. Assuming that the fine is set to its maximum value,
f , the problem of the regulator can be stated as follows:
max
γ,q
(
n
∫
α
pi (y∗i , αi, X) dg(α)− cmγn
)
s.t. y∗i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− γf (max (0, yi − q))] ,∀i
n
∫
α
y∗i (αi, q, γ,X) dg(α) = F (X)
0 ≤ γ ≤ mn
(5)
The first line of equation (5) is the sum of industry extraction profit, which is given
7Note that regulators typically differentiate quotas according to e.g. the type and size of the firm. This
is not our focus and to keep the analysis tractable we abstract from this. Extending the model accordingly
is easy.
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as the number of firms n multiplied by the average extraction profit over all firms,
minus inspection cost (cmγn). Industry profit depends on the distribution of the cost
parameter α. The problem is to choose the quota and inspection rate that maximize
extraction profits subject to three constraints: (i) that firms choose profit maximizing
harvest quantities (second line), (ii) that aggregate harvest equals stock growth in
equilibrium (third line), and (iii) that the inspection rate does not cause a violation of
the inspection budget (fourth line). If aggregate catch must be regulated the solution
to this problem is to set quotas so tight that all firms are induced to catch illegally
and hence are constrained by the expected fine on illegal catches rather than by the
quota. The regulator then sets inspection rates (γ) so that the optimal catch level is
achieved. This ensures an efficient allocation of the aggregate catch target since all
firms are constrained by the same expected fine.8
In practice regulators do not do this. Rather, the standard regulatory approach
is to take the enforcement system and its costs as given (i.e. fix inspection costs at
the allowed maximum) and use the resource quota q as the only policy instrument.9
Hence, γ is fixed at its maximum level, γ¯ = mn , and the problem becomes:
max
q
(
n
∫
α
pi (y∗i , αi, X) dg(α)− cmγ¯n
)
s.t. y∗i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− γ¯f (max (0, yi − q))] ,∀i
n
∫
α
y∗i (α, q, γ¯,X) dg(α) = F (X)
(6)
For large q no firms are constrained in their harvest. All firms face a zero marginal
shadow price on the harvest quota. As q is reduced, there is a point at which some
firms become constrained, and from this point onward, reducing q further reduces ag-
gregate harvest. As q falls, more firms become constrained, and firms that are already
constrained become more constrained and consequently face a larger marginal shadow
price of their quota. At some point the most efficient firms begin to find it profitable
to harvest illegally (when the marginal shadow cost of their catch quota exceeds the
expected fine). From this point onward, these firms do not reduce their catches when
the quota is reduced. They are constrained by the expected fine generated by the en-
forcement system, not by the quota system. At some point q is at a level where all firms
harvest illegally and no further reductions in aggregate harvest occur when the quota
8In contrast, if firms were constrained by the uniform catch quota or by different expected fines instead
of by the same expected fine, aggregate catch would be allocated inefficiently because the firms would not
face the same marginal shadow price of catches.
9This means that the entire inspection budget is spent, which implies a maximization of the inspection
rate γ.
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is reduced. Thus beyond this point the quota instrument is not effective. Reductions
in aggregate catch beyond this point are not possible under the traditional inspection
system since fines and inspection costs are at their maximum constraints. Between
these two points the quota instrument is effective in the sense that aggregate harvest
is affected when the quota is adjusted.10 On the other hand, the quota instrument is
clearly not efficient since heterogeneous firms face different marginal shadow prices of
catches when constrained by a uniform catch quota. The standard recommendation
in this situation is to make quotas tradable, which would allow for an equalization of
shadow prices of catches across firms.
However, in many fisheries there are substantial non-compliance problems and one
may in fact be close to or at the point where all firms violate quotas. In such cases,
(almost) all firms are exceeding their catch quotas and are thus constrained by the
expected fine on illegal catches. When all fishing firms face (and perceive) the same
inspection probability, their perceived shadow price of catches become identical. Conse-
quently, low cost firms (low α) will harvest more than high cost firms (high α), resulting
in higher cost efficiency than if all firms harvested the same quantity regardless of cost
differences. Hence, if one is at or close to the point where all firms fish illegally, the
gain from tradability is limited and non-tradable quotas may be (nearly) as efficient
as tradable quotas. In this situation it may also be efficient to set the probability of
inspection equal to the maximum constraint γ = γ¯ (spending the entire inspection
budget) as regulators typically do.
The main problem that regulators face in this situation is that further reductions
in aggregate harvest beyond the point where no firm complies with quotas cannot be
achieved by further reductions in quotas. This is because all firms are violating their
quotas, which means that their catch levels are not constrained by their quota but by
the size of the expected punishment induced by the enforcement system. Hence, it
may be well founded when resource regulators seem more concerned with the lack of
effectiveness of quotas than with quotas being tradable. If a fishery manager is in this
situation and is constrained by an upper limit on enforcement resources and fines, it
seems reasonable to try to increase the effectiveness of enforcement by differentiating
inspection probabilities between fishing firms. As noted in the introduction, although
such differentiation typically is not part of the formal enforcement system, this may
10Note that aggregate harvest is not generally equal to the aggregate quota. Initially, the aggregate harvest
is lower than the aggregate quota because many fishing firms do not fully utilize a lax quota. As the quota is
tightened vessels become constrained and illegal fishing becomes an option. Hence, at some point aggregate
catch exceeds the aggregate quota. As long as at least some firms are constrained by the quota, tightening
of the quota affects these vessels and quotas are thus effective in reducing aggregate catch.
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be what fisheries control agencies in some cases are trying to do when they target
vessels that have been less compliant than others in the past. To the extent that
this results in targeting of vessels that are more sensitive to changes in expected fines,
effectiveness is increased. However, the observation that a vessel is less compliant
than others does not necessarily mean that the vessel is more sensitive to increases
in the expected fine.11 Furthermore, regardless of whether this type of inspection
differentiation increases or decreases effectiveness, the fishing firms will face different
expected fines, and, consequently, the allocation of aggregate catch will become less
efficient.
Alternative enforcement schemes must be considered if fisheries managers are to
achieve further reductions in aggregate harvest while ensuring that they are efficiently
allocated. The self-report based enforcement system proposed next aims at doing just
that.
3 The Self-Report Based Enforcement System
In this section we propose an alternative to the traditional quota enforcement system
based on self reporting and differential inspection rates. Although illegal fishing is a
considerable problem worldwide (Sumaila et al., 2006; Agnew et al., 2009), neither self
reporting nor differentiated inspections have been formally analyzed in the context of
fisheries, nor have they been applied in fisheries regulation.12
Our proposed alternative enforcement system is presented within the same frame-
work as the traditional enforcement system introduced above. There are, however,
some important differences. Instead of inspecting all firms with the same probability,
firms are assigned to one of two enforcement groups with different inspection proba-
bilities; group 1 with low probability of inspection, and group 2 with high probability
of inspection. In the first group, firms are allowed to self report harvest quantities in
excess of quota, in which case there is a rebate on the fine paid. If inspected firms
are found to have self reported all excess catches they remain in the first group. If
they have not, they must pay the full fine and are moved to the second inspection
group. The threat of being moved to the second group, the so-called “control hell”
11That is, compliance, y∗i (αi, q, γ,X)−q, may be positively, negatively or uncorrelated with the sensitivity
to changes in expected punishment,
∂y∗i (αi,q,γ,X)
∂γ
12Some regulatory systems have elements that resemble self reporting. In many regions, such as Australia,
Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Norway, and the United States, fishing vessels are required to keep
logbooks with information about their catches and harvest activities. However, the key element of a self
report enforcement system, namely that firms are given incentives to self report violations, is to our knowledge
not an element in current fisheries regulation systems.
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with high inspection rates, is an effective deterrent that makes it possible to increase
firms’ perceived punishment relative to the traditional enforcement system, without
increasing inspection costs.13 In addition, the self-reporting scheme allows the regula-
tor to use the self report rebate, that is, the reduction in fine when a firm self reports
excess catches, as an additional control variable. This makes it possible to increase the
allocation efficiency of the system, as will be shown below.
The idea of using the threat of “control hell” to strengthen the incentives to comply
without increasing fines or inspection costs was originally suggested by Greenberg
(1984). We use it here in basically the same form but for a different purpose; to induce
self reporting of violations rather than compliance. Self reporting of violations in the
environmental enforcement literature is often seen as a way to increase efficiency by
reallocating inspection resources to firms that do not self report violations (Kaplow &
Shavell, 1994; Malik, 1993; Innes, 1999). This is because violations in these models
can take on only one value and a self reported violation by a rational agent therefore
must be truthful. In our setting quota violations can take on a continuum of values
and therefore require inspection to ensure truthfulness. This type of violations are
considered by Macho-Stadler & Pe´rez-Castrillo (2006), but in their model they find
that allocation of resources should be focused on inducing compliance rather than
truthful self reporting. In our case we are enforcing an inefficient allocation of quotas
and it is therefore better to allow firms to exceed their quotas and instead induce
truthful self reporting of excess catches, which improves the allocative efficiency.
3.1 The Regulator and Enforcement
The inspection probability depends on whether the firm is in group 1 or group 2 and
is denoted γj ∈ [0, 1], where j = 1, 2 refers to the group. A firm in group 1 that self
reports harvest in excess of quota, must pay a fine rf per unit, where r ∈ (0, 1) is a
factor indicating the fine rebate for self reporting. In group 2, self reporting gives no
rebate, hence, a firm that self reports must pay the full fine f per unit. Furthermore, a
firm in group 1 that is inspected and found to have underreported its quota violation
must pay the full fine and is moved to group 2. Once in group 2, the firm stays there
until found to have self reported correctly during u consecutive inspections after which
the firm is moved back into group 1.
The inspection probabilities in table 1 are determined by the regulator and are
constrained by the inspection budget. As under the traditional enforcement system,
13To make “control hell’ even crueler to strengthen its deterrence effect, there are several possibilities, such
as to introduce quota reductions for firms while in “hell.”
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Table 1: Punishment Scheme
Group 1 Group 2
Self report Violate Self report Violate
Not inspected rf(yi − q) 0 f(yi − q) 0
Inspected rf(yi − q) f(yi − q) f(yi − q) f(yi − q)
Inspection prob. γ1 γ2 > γ1
Violate: move to group 2 Full self reporting u times:
move to group 1
the regulator can perform a given number of inspections per year, denoted m, which
determines the inspection probability. If all firms are equally likely to be inspected (all
firms are in group 1), the inspection probability is γ1 ≤ mn .14. The inspection rate is
higher in group 2 than in group 1. Hence, the more firms there are in inspection group
2, the lower the inspection rate can be in group 1.15 The maximum fine is assumed to
be exogenously given and high enough to fully deter quota violations if applied with
certainty.
As under the traditional enforcement system, the regulator seeks to maximize total
industry profit net of enforcement costs n
∫
α
pi (y∗, α,X) dg(α)−cγn, where γ in this case
refers to the average inspection rate over both inspection groups (weighted average).
However, now the set of policy instruments available to the regulator includes two
inspection rates (γ1 and γ2) and the period of time a firm must be in “control hell”
(group 2) following the detection of a violation, before it can be moved back into group
1.
To ensure an efficient allocation of aggregate catch across firms, the regulator sets
the total quota sufficiently low for the individual quota to be binding for all firms and
inducing them to exceed the quota.
3.2 The Firms
Under the self report based enforcement system, the firm has four main options. It can
(i) comply with its quota, (ii) report the entire illegal extraction, (iii) report some of the
illegal extraction, or (iv) not report any extraction in excess of the quota. With a fine
structure that is linear in illegal quantity and detection probabilities being constant,
14The inspection probability is assumed to be positive and strictly below one.
15In general, the following must hold: 1 ≥ γ2 > γ1 > 0. In addition, the inspection budget cannot be
exceeded, which implies that γ1 ≤ m−γ2n2n−n2 , where n2 is the number of firms in inspection group 2.
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it is easily shown that the firm either reports all or does not self report any excess
extraction. Thus, the relevant options for a firm are reduced from four to three, as
option (iii), where one exceeds the quota and reports only part of the excess quantity,
is never chosen.
On this basis, there are three distinct behavioral strategies a profit maximizing firm
can use and the firm chooses the strategy that yields the highest sum of discounted
future profits.
• Strategy A: Stay in group 1. To ensure that the firm is never moved into group
2, the firm must always act in compliance with regulations. Consequently, the
firm must self report any excess extraction (options i or ii). Since the quota is
set sufficiently low for no firm to find option (i) optimal, only option (ii) remains.
In a sustainable equilibrium, optimal harvest is the same in all periods. Hence,
yai = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− rf (yi − q)], which gives a net expected profit of
Πai = pi (y
a
i , αi, X)− rf (yai − q). Letting EV ai denote the present value of future
profits for firm i when following strategy A we have that:
EV ai =
∞∑
t=0
βtΠai , (7)
where β is the discount factor (β = 1 implies no discounting while β = 0 implies
that future periods are completely disregarded).
• Strategy B: Alternate between groups. To alternate between groups, the firm
must be willing to violate regulations while in group 1, and comply with reg-
ulations while in group 2. Thus, the behavior of a firm that follows strat-
egy B depends on the inspection group the firm is currently in. In inspec-
tion group 1, the firm chooses to violate quotas (option iv), while in group
2, the firm self reports all excess extraction (option ii). Formally, when in
group 1, the firm sets yb1i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− γ1f (yi − q)], which gives
net expected profit of Πb1i = pi
(
yb1i , αi, X
) − γ1f (yb1i − q). In group 2, the firm
sets yb2i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− f (yi − q)], which gives net expected profit of
Πb2i = pi
(
yb2i , αi, X
)−f (yb2i − q). In the first period under this strategy, the firm
is in group 1 and expected profit is Πb1i . The inspection rate γ is the probability
of being moved to group 2 in the next period, and hence, expected profit in the
next period is (1 − γ)Πb1i + γΠb2i . In every future period t the firm perceives
some probability 0 ≤ νi(t) ≤ 1 of being in group 2 (where νi(0) = 0, νi(1) = γ,
etc.). Hence, the expected profit in period t is (1− νi(t)) Πb1i + νi(t)Πb2i . Thus,
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the present value of future profits under strategy B becomes:
EV bi =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1− νi(t)) Πb1i + νi(t)Πb2i
]
, (8)
where 0 ≤ νi(t) ≤ 1 for all t.
• Strategy C: Stay in group 2. To always be in group 2, the firm must never
comply with its quota nor self report excess extraction. Thus, the firm’s only
option is to always violate the quota (option iv). This yields a catch quantity
of ycit = arg max
yit
[pi (yit, αi, Xt)− γ2f (yit − qt)], with corresponding net expected
profit of Πcit = pi (y
c
it, αi, Xt) − γ2f (ycit − qt). The present value of future profits
for a firm following strategy C is:
EV ci =
∞∑
t=0
βtΠci . (9)
Since the maximum fine (f) is assumed to be sufficiently high to fully deter vio-
lations if applied with certainty, strategy C is always dominated by self reporting in
group 2, that is, by strategy B when γ2 = 1. Thus, firms will choose either strategy A
or strategy B.
3.3 Welfare implications
Compared to the traditional enforcement system, there are several more policy instru-
ments available under the self-report based system. It is clear that introducing more
enforcement policy variables as part of the regulators set of control variables cannot
reduce welfare if policy variables are set optimally, since the traditional enforcement
system is a possible specification. In the following we prove two propositions showing
that there generally is a welfare gain when shifting to the self report based enforce-
ment system. The first proposition considers the situation where quotas under the
traditional enforcement system have been tightened so much that all firms violate.
In this situation all firms are constrained by the expected fine (none are quota con-
strained), hence, further quota reductions have no effect on aggregate harvest. The
first proposition states that a self-report based enforcement system allows the regulator
to implement further (welfare increasing) reductions in aggregate harvest and that it
ensures an efficient distribution of these reductions across firms. The second propo-
sition considers the situation where quotas under the traditional enforcement system
are still effective (i.e., some firms are quota constrained) and states that in such case
14
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the aggregate harvest target can be implemented more efficiently under a self-report
based enforcement system.
Proposition 1. When all firms under traditional enforcement violate quotas, so that
aggregate harvest cannot be reduced further under this enforcement system, there gen-
erally exists an enforcement system with self reporting and differential inspections that
reduces aggregate harvest and allocates this reduction efficiently among firms without
increasing the inspection budget of the enforcement agency.
Proof. The proof of proposition 1 begins by considering a differentiated inspection
system where the inspection rates are γ1 = γ and γ2 = 1, and where the fine rebate
factor when self reporting is r = γ. Noting that quotas are exceeded by all firms
when the expected fine is γf , we have that yai = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− rf (yi − q)],
yb1i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− γf (yi − q)], and yb2i = arg max
yi
[pi (yi, αi, X)− f (yi − q)].
Consequently, the net expected profits associated with the harvest levels of the different
strategies are so that Πa = Πb1 > Πb2.
This implies that βtΠai ≥ βt
[
(1− νi(t)) Πb1i + νi(t)Πb2i
]
for all t when 0 ≤ νi(t) ≤ 1.
Hence, by equations (7) and (8) we have that
EV ai =
∞∑
t=0
βtΠai ≥
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(1− νi(t)) Πb1i + νi(t)Πb2i
]
= EV bi .
Furthermore, from νi(1) = γ, the second element of the right-hand side sum is (1 −
γ)Πb1i + γΠ
b2
i , which is strictly smaller than the second element of the left-hand side
sum βΠai if β > 0. Thus, the expected present value of strategy A is strictly larger
than that of strategy B if β > 0, while EV ai = EV
b
i only in the case of β = 0, that is,
if the firm completely disregards the future. It follows that for β > 0, where EV ai is
strictly greater than EV bi , there exists a value of r = γ + , where  is a small positive
constant, for which strategy A dominates for all firms. Thus, with self reporting and
differentiated inspection rates it is possible to reduce illegal catches slightly, without
exceeding the exogenous constraint on the imposed fine or the inspection budget. Since
all firms choose strategy A, no firms enter group 2, and hence total inspection costs
equals cγn. Furthermore, since all firms self report all quantities in excess of quotas
and pay rf per unit, firms’ optimal harvest quantities ensure that all firms face the
same marginal shadow cost of harvesting in equilibrium. Consequently, the aggregate
harvest reduction is allocated efficiently across firms.
Corollary 1. In the situation specified in proposition 1, an enforcement system with
self reporting and differential inspections allocates a reduction in aggregate harvest
15
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more efficiently than what is possible with a differentiation of inspection rates under
the traditional enforcement system.
Corollary 2. In the situation specified in proposition 1, an enforcement system with
self reporting and differential inspections allocates a reduction in aggregate harvest more
efficiently than differentiated inspection rates under the traditional enforcement system
(β = 0).
Proof. From proposition 1 it follows that the self-report based enforcement system with
differentiated inspections allocates the reduction efficiently. Hence, no other enforce-
ment system can allocate a reduction more efficiently. Furthermore, any reduction in
aggregate catch resulting from a differentiation of inspection rates under the traditional
enforcement system implies a corresponding differentiation of expected fines. Since any
differentiation of expected fines results in an inefficient allocation of aggregate catch,
such allocation must be strictly less efficient than the allocation implemented by the
enforcement system with self reporting and differentiated inspections.
Proposition 2. When some firms under the traditional enforcement system do not
violate quotas, there generally exists an enforcement system based on self reporting and
differentiated inspection rates that implements the same aggregate harvest target more
efficiently without increasing the inspection budget of the enforcement agency.
Proof. Consider the same differentiated inspection system as above, with inspection
rates γ1 = γ and γ2 = 1 and with a self-report rebate factor of r = γ. From the proof
of proposition 1 it is clear that EV ai > EV
b
i for all firms that violate their quotas when
β > 0. If the self-report rebate factor r is increased slightly, this will also be the case
for β = 0. Thus, all firms that violate their quota will choose strategy A and self report
their violations. Now, consider a quota reduction to the point where all firms choose to
exceed their quotas. This results in aggregate harvest below the target. Next, reduce
inspection rates in group 1 and increase the self-report rebate factor proportionally
(reduce γ and r proportionally) until aggregate harvest again reaches the target level.
The proportional reduction in γ and r will ensure the dominance of strategy A over
strategy B so that all firms continue to follow strategy A. Since all firms exceed their
quota and fully self report (i.e., remain in group 1), they all face the same marginal
shadow cost of catch in equilibrium. Thus, the aggregate catch target under self-
report based enforcement is implemented efficiently. By assumption, some firms are
constrained by quotas and not fines under the traditional enforcement system. Hence,
the aggregate harvest target under traditional enforcement is implemented inefficiently.
Since all firms under the self-report based enforcement system choose strategy A, no
16
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firms enter group 2, and inspection rates in group 1 are reduced so that total inspection
costs are reduced relative to the traditional enforcement system: cγn ≤ C. Thus, under
the self-report based enforcement system, it is possible to reach the same aggregate
production target more efficiently then under the traditional enforcement system and
without exceeding the exogenous constraint on the fine with lower inspection costs.
It follows that irrespectively of how intensive quota regulation is under the tra-
ditional enforcement system (with uniform inspection rates), a shift to the proposed
self-report based enforcement system will generally allow the regulator to increase
welfare. Our focus is the situation where traditional quota regulation is no longer
effective (covered by proposition 1 and its two corollaries). The advantages of the
proposed enforcement system in this situation arise from the combination of differen-
tiated inspection rates and the possibility to self report excess harvest. First, with two
inspection groups, the risk of being moved to “control hell” increases expected punish-
ment relative to the traditional compliance system without increasing inspection costs.
Second, self reporting in effect allows the regulator to use the self-report rebate factor
rather than the harvest quota as the control variable when implementing the aggre-
gate harvest target, which ensures efficient allocation of total harvest quantity across
heterogenous firms. This is why reducing aggregate catch by shifting to an enforce-
ment system with self reporting and differential inspections results in a strictly greater
welfare increase then would result from any possible differentiation of inspection rates
within the traditional enforcement system.
4 An Example
In the previous sections we showed that the proposed enforcement system based on
self reporting and differentiated inspections generally is better than the traditional en-
forcement system. We now illustrate this by looking at an example and numerically
simulate equilibrium effects under different combinations of key parameters character-
izing the enforcement problem. The key parameter that we vary in the following is the
growth rate of the fish stock, which has implications for the productivity of the fishing
industry and thereby the required intensity of regulation.16
16The higher the growth rate, all else equal, the stronger the need for regulation and enforcement in order
to maintain a certain stock level since the stock regenerates more slowly, while the incentives of the individual
fishermen to harvest are unchanged.
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4.1 Model specification
As above, there are n firms in the industry and the per-period extraction profit of firm
i is given by the following quadratic functional form:
pi(yi, αi, X) = pyi − αiy
2
i
2X
. (10)
We assume the firm specific cost parameter α is uniformly distributed: g(α) = 1α¯−α for
α¯ ≥ α ≥ α. A firm’s revenue is given as the product of the fixed output price p and
the quantity produced yi. The cost function in (10) is increasing and convex in harvest
quantity, and decreasing in the size of the fish stock X. Any price or cost differences
between fish extracted legally and illegally are disregarded.17
Industry production is subject to the resource constraint:
∆X = F (X)− Y = hX
(
1− X
K
)
− Y (11)
where h and K, respectively, denote the intrinsic growth rate and the carrying capacity
of the resource stock.
The objective is to compare different enforcement systems. To facilitate comparison
we assume that the goal of the fishery manager always is to maximize sustainable yield.
This means that discounting and costs are disregarded when determining the optimal
catch and stock levels, and, consequently, the target equilibrium level is generally not
economically optimal. We analyze implementation of the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) target under the traditional quota enforcement system and the proposed self-
report based system, which are presented in what follows.18
Under traditional enforcement, the regulator chooses the quota Q and the inspection
probability γ so as to achieve the aggregate catch target, which is enforced by imposing
a given fine f through undifferentiated inspection (nγ inspections). The inspection rate
is constrained upward by the inspection budget. Firm profits depend on whether the
firm complies with or violates the quota. A compliant firm’s profit is given by (10)
17The analysis easily generalizes to the case of price and/or cost differences between legal and illegal
extraction.
18We focus on steady states and do not analyze the dynamic trajectory toward steady state. However,
the results presented in what follows generalize beyond the steady state and to other policy objectives than
the MSY target, including that of maximizing economic yield (MEY). The MSY target was chosen for
two reasons. First, it is the same for all modifications of the enforcement system and therefore facilitates
comparison across systems. Second, it is easier to calculate than the MEY target and therefore allows us to
focus more attention on the more important question of whether and to what degree the target is reached
under different modifications of the enforcement system.
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with yi ≤ q. If the firm violates the quota, the expected profits are reduced by the
expected fine (cf. equation 4). The firms’ profit maximizing harvest levels are easily
derived by solving the profit maximizing problem for each value of αi.
19 Aggregate
harvest can then be calculated as the sum over all n firms.
Under self-report based enforcement we assume the regulator sets the quota q low
enough so that it constrains all firms. This implies the quota constraint q < q¯ ≡ pXα¯ ,
where a quota below q¯ induces all firms to exceed their quota. The question then is
whether firms choose to self report. This depends on the size of the self-report rebate
factor (r), the inspection probabilities (γ1 and γ2) and the time period the firm must
remain in group 2 if inspected and found to have exceeded the quota without truthfully
self reporting (u).
The fine f is exogenous. Let the inspection rate in group 2 be γ2 = 1 and assume
the inspection rate in group 1 is set so that the inspection budget is met. When all
firms choose strategy A, this implies that γ1 is equal to the number of inspections
available under the budget constraint divided by the total number of firms. If some
firms choose strategy B, the inspection rate in group 1 must be reduced not to exceed
the inspection budget because of the higher intensity of inspections in group 2. No
firm chooses strategy C. Hence, the problem of the regulator is to set the self-report
rebate factor r to reach the aggregate catch target.
For ease of exposition, we assume the parameter u always can be set sufficiently
high for no firm to prefer strategy B to strategy A.20 Hence, u is chosen so that the
following inequality holds: α0 < α, where α0 is the value of α a firm is indifferent
between strategies A and B. Hence, u is set high enough to ensure that all firms
choose strategy A. Based on the reaction function of strategy A firms we can derive
the aggregate catch response function (details are given in appendix A.2):
Y =
nX (p− rf)
α¯− α ln
(
α¯
α
)
. (12)
In steady state the aggregate catch must equal the natural growth of the fish stock
(cf. equation 3). Setting Y = F (X) and solving for the self-report rebate factor r
yields:
ro =
1
f
p− h (1− XK ) (α¯− α)
n ln
(
α¯
α
)
 . (13)
19For details, see appendix A.1.
20The derivation of aggregate catch as a function of policy parameters when strategy B cannot be excluded
is shown in appendix A.2
19
Working Paper No. 25/10
Equation (13) gives the value of the rebate factor r that ensures an equilibrium ag-
gregate catch level of F (X) = Y .21 The optimal fine rebate factor ro is seen to be
increasing in the steady-state stock level (X), decreasing in the size of the fine (f),
increasing in the output price (p), decreasing in the growth rate of the stock (h), and
increasing in the degree of cost heterogeneity measured by the difference between the
upper and lower bounds on the uniformly distributed cost parameter (α¯ and α). Recall
that the lower the value of r the higher the value of the per unit rebate obtained by
self reporting ones excess catches. To find the self-report rebate factor r that ensures
that aggregate steady-state catches equal MSY, we can substitute for the maximum
sustainable yield stock level, Xmsy, in equation (13).
4.2 Enforcement system equilibria
We now specify parameter values to numerically analyze the equilibria of the two
enforcement systems. Parameter values are given in table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values
Parameter Value Description
p 0.5 Price (per unit)
f 1 Fine (per unit)
[α, α¯] [75, 125] Interval, cost parameter α
n 100 Number of fishing firms
m 20 Total number of inspections given by budget
h [0, 1.0217] Interval, intrinsic growth rate of resource stock
K 500 Carrying capacity of fish stock
We consider a vector of different values of h, the intrinsic growth rate of the stock.
We define required regulatory intensity (RRI) as an indicator of the level of enforce-
ment required to maintain the stock at the target level (MSY). The required regulatory
intensity is a function of the growth rate of the stock. The higher the growth rate,
ceteris paribus, the less enforcement is needed to maintain a certain stock level since
the stock replenishes itself faster thereby allowing for larger aggregate catches. Fur-
thermore, we normalize the regulatory intensity to lie between zero and one. When the
growth rate of the stock is at its highest (h = 1.0217), RRI is zero. As the growth rate
21Note that parameter values exist for which ro < 0 or ro > 1. However, assuming a profitable industry
ensures ro > 0. The constraint ro ≤ 1 can be violated at a high output price p or a large number of firms n,
which implies a lower inspection rate for a given inspection budget. For the parameter values used in this
example, the optimal rebate factor ro is always feasible (i.e., 0 ≤ ro ≤ 1).
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is gradually reduced from this point toward h = 0, the regulatory intensity gradually
increases toward one. Formally, the required regulatory intensity is defined as follows:
RRI = 1− h− h
h¯− h,
where h¯ and h are the upper and lower values considered of the intrinsic growth rate.
The upper value h¯ = 1.0217 is chosen as the value that yields equilibrium aggregate
catch equal to MSY under open access (no enforcement). In that particular case MSY
is 124.515 units of fish (MSY = hK4 ). The lower the intrinsic growth rate relative to
this point, the lower the MSY and the higher the RRI. Notice that the MSY stock level
is independent of the growth rate of the stock and therefore equal to Xmsy =
K
2 = 250
for all h.
We start out analyzing traditional enforcement. With a given inspection budget and
a fixed cost per inspection, the regulator can perform a total of m = 20 inspections per
period. Without differentiation in inspections across firms, this gives a probability of
inspection of γ = mn = 0.20 for each firm. With fines given exogenously, the regulator
has two instruments that can be used to reach the MSY target; namely the size of the
quota and the inspection rate, with the latter constrained to γ ∈ [0, 0.20]. To minimize
enforcement costs, the regulator always chooses the lowest possible inspection rate γ in
cases where there is a trade-off between setting a lower quota and a higher inspection
rate.
The steady-state equilibrium under traditional enforcement as a function of RRI
is shown in figure 1. As the RRI increases from zero (where MSY is reached without
regulations), a steady increase in the inspection rate γ is required to maintain the
equilibrium at the MSY level. The problem under traditional enforcement is that
the inspection rate cannot exceed γ = 0.20, due to the inspection budget constraint.
Therefore, as the RRI exceeds 0.40 (or for growth rates h < 0.61), it is not possible
to reach the target steady state of MSY. For fisheries with lower growth rates the
regulator cannot reach the target stock and aggregate catch levels without violating
the budget constraint. This is evident in the lower panel of figure 1. As the RRI
approaches one (i.e., stock growth rate decreases toward zero), the equilibrium stock
and aggregate catch approach zero because the inspection rate is too low.
Under self-report based enforcement the regulator has several additional instruments
to control aggregate harvest. The number of periods a firm must be in control hell upon
being apprehended for illegal fishing (u) is held constant in this example, but could
have been used to affect aggregate harvest. In addition, the regulator can vary the self-
report rebate factor r, the quota Q, and the inspection probabilities γ1 and γ2. Since
21
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Figure 1: Equilibrium under traditional enforcement system as a function of RRI. Inspection
rate in upper panel, equilibrium stock (dashed line) and aggregate harvest in lower panel.
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we already assumed u was set sufficiently high to deter all firms from choosing strategy
B, no firm will be in enforcement group 2 (control hell), and hence, no inspections are
necessary in group 2. This leaves the regulator with the inspection rate γ1 = γ ≤ 0.2
in group 1, in addition to the quota and the self-report rebate factor, as the relevant
policy instruments.
Recall that the total quota is set low enough for the quotas to binding for all firms.
The threshold level for when the quota binds is q¯ = hK(α¯−α)4α¯n(ln α¯−lnα) , which depends on,
among other factors, the growth rate h. In the numerical analysis we set the quota
to 80% of q¯ × n, which means that we let the total quota increase with the growth
rate h. Furthermore, we only consider self-report rebate factors r below 0.5, which is
a requirement for firms to choose to self-report their excess catches.22
The regulator can calculate the optimal self-reporting rebate factor according to
equation (13). The resulting ro increases linearly with the RRI toward the upper limit
22From the optimality condition of strategy A firms, it is clear that unless p > rf , no firm would choose
to self report.
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of 0.5. The self-report based enforcement system is never constrained, and hence, the
regulator can reach the objective of MSY regardless of the RRI. A condition for this to
hold is that the regulator can in fact set u high enough to deter all firms from exceeding
quotas without self reporting (strategy B). The more firms must pay per self reported
unit, the higher u must be for this to hold, all else equal. If u is constrained, the self-
report based enforcement system could reach a limit beyond which it is not possible to
reach the steady-state target catch level. Nonetheless, the flexibility of the self-report
based enforcement system is always greater than that of the traditional system.
Comparison of enforcement systems
Having characterized and analyzed the equilibria of the two enforcement systems over
a range of RRIs, we turn to a comparison of the effectiveness and efficiency of the
systems. We do this by calculating equilibrium welfare net of inspection costs for each
enforcement system.23 We consider two specification of the traditional enforcement
system; the standard specification where everyone faces the same inspection rate and
a scenario where the control agency has the ability to perfectly differentiate inspection
rates across firms based on their cost efficiency.24
Results are summarized in table 3. The self-report based system is fully efficient
and represents the first-best solution. Traditional enforcement with a uniform inspec-
tion rate is efficient when a relatively little enforcement is necessary to maintain the
fish stock at target (MSY) levels (low RRI). As the RRI increases beyond 0.40, the tra-
ditional system becomes less and less efficient relative to the self-report based system.
The inspection budget constraint has been reached and the enforcement effort cannot
be increased any further. As a result the equilibrium stock level is lower than the
target, which reduces welfare. In contrast, the more flexible self-report based system
is efficient over the full range of RRIs and generates considerably higher profits over
23Inspection costs are disregarded. This is because under self-report based enforcement, there is a trade-off
between the inspection rate γ1, and hence the inspection cost, and the number of periods a detected non-
compliant firm must be in inspection group 2 u. Consequently, inspection costs under unconstrained self-
report based enforcement can almost be fully eliminated if only u is increased sufficiently and the inspection
rate is (marginally) larger than zero. This is not an option under traditional enforcement, where deterrence
depends critically on the inspection rate and the fine payment if detected. Hence, by not deducting inspection
costs from welfare, we underestimate the advantage of the self-report based system relative to traditional
enforcement.
24Hence, we assume that the regulator can observe each firm’s cost parameter αi and that the firms know
their respective inspection rates.
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a large interval of RRIs (0.41-0.6).25 For an RRI of 0.5, the traditional system only
achieves 89.5% of the potential welfare while the equilibrium aggregate catch is 4.1%
below the optimal (target) level. As the RRI increases, the gap between the outcomes
under the traditional system and the self-report based system increases. For high val-
ues of RRI, that is, for slow growing species, traditional enforcement cannot prevent
extinction.
As long as the RRI is low, it is optimal to let the inspection rate be the same for
all firms in order to promote efficient allocation of aggregate catch. However, when the
objective of MSY can no longer be achieved with an undifferentiated inspection rate
(γi = 0.2, ∀i), illegal fishing can be reduced by increasing the inspection rates of the
most cost efficient firms, while reducing the inspection rates facing the least efficient
firms. We explore this possibility by introducing perfect differentiation of inspection
rates under the traditional system.26
The numerical analysis shows that with perfectly differentiated inspection rates,
the MSY catch target can be achieved for RRIs below 0.47, compared to 0.41 with
a uniform inspection rate. By targeting those firms that have the highest sensitivity
to changes in expected punishment (i.e., the most cost efficient firms), the regulator
can reach the catch target for a wider range of RRIs. However, this reduces the cost
efficiency of the fleet because it causes inefficient allocation of catches across firms. This
results in a loss of welfare even if aggregate catch levels are close to or at the target
level. Hence, under perfect differentiation of inspection rates the loss in welfare comes
from two sources; lower yields and inefficient allocation of catches across firms. This
is illustrated in table 3, where aggregate catch levels under traditional enforcement for
RRIs of 0.4 and 0.5 are higher when inspection rates are perfectly differentiated, while
welfare levels are considerably lower. For an RRI of 0.5, the regulator almost achieves
the catch target using perfect differentiation of inspection rates (99.4%). However,
the inefficient allocation of catches causes a significant reduction in welfare (33.7%
reduction compared to first-best solution).
Thus far, we have shown that self-report based enforcement is always at least as
efficient as the traditional system. The the RRI is relatively low little is gained from in-
troducing the self report based system. If, on the other hand, the need for enforcement
is high relative to the available enforcement resources, the potential gains from intro-
25If we also account for inspection costs, the self-report based system is superior to the traditional system
over whole interval of RRIs, since the inspection rate under self-reporting can always be reduced slightly
compared to the traditional system, by increasing u.
26This represents the best possible outcome in terms of achieving the MSY target by use of differentiated
inspection rates. In real industries, regulators do not have perfect information on firm-level costs and must
settle with imperfect differentiation of inspection rates.
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Table 3: Equilibrium welfare and yield for different RRIs by enforcement system. Outcomes
relative to first best solution (100 = optimal).
RRI 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.74
Welfare Yield Welfare Yield Welfare Yield Welfare Yield
First best solution 26.83 76.66 23.96 63.88 20.44 51.11 14.45 33.22
Outcome by scenario
Trad., uniform insp. 100 100 89.5 95.9 65.7 75.1 5.8 7.3
Trad., diff. insp. 100 100 66.3 99.4 55.2 88.3 0 0
Self reporting 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
ducing the self-report based system are considerable. The above analysis was based on
the assumption that u, the number of periods a detected violator must spend in group
2 (control hell), can be chosen freely. In real-world resource management, u is likely to
be constrained. We therefore conclude this section by investigating the implications of
imposing an upper limit on the enforcement parameter u.
When u is constrained, it is no longer necessarily the case that all firms choose
strategy A (self reporting). As long as some firms choose strategy B, these firms will
be moved back and forth between inspection groups 1 and 2, depending on whether
their quota violations are detected and the time period they must spend in group 2 once
detected, u. If u is constraint to 1, 2 or 3 years, respectively, a strategy B firm spends
83.33%, 71.43% and 62.50% of the time in group 1 in the long run. Assuming that the
number of firms is sufficiently large, we can interpret these numbers as the shares of
strategy B firms in groups 1 in equilibrium. This is used to calculate aggregate catches
under the constrained self-report based enforcement system.
Our numerical results show that self-report based enforcement is considerably less
flexible when u is constrained. The lower the upper limit on u, the smaller is the interval
of RRIs over which the enforcement system is capable of reaching the target harvest
level. The constrained self-report based enforcement system can maintain the target
equilibrium level for RRIs above 0.41 (u = 3), 0.42 (u = 2) or 0.43 (u = 1).27 The RRI
at which the constrained enforcement system no longer can achieve the harvest target is
basically the same as the point where the traditional system fails to achieve the target.
Hence, if the degree of punishment in “control hell” is constrained, the flexibility of the
27To improve the performance of a constrained self-report based system we can introduce quota reductions
for firms in group 2. In the current analysis we have assumed no quota reductions in group 2. In general, any
strategy can be used that makes “control hell” more hellish and thereby further deters firms from choosing
strategy B.
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self-report based enforcement system is considerably reduced. However, as we proved
in the theoretical analysis, the self-report based system is at least as efficient as the
traditional system when the latter is limited by the inspection budget constraint.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present an alternative enforcement system for quota regulated re-
source industries. The system is based on self reports of catches in excess of quotas
and differentiated inspection rates based on firms’ compliance records. We show how
the proposed enforcement system can increase both the efficiency and the effective-
ness of quota enforcement compared to the traditional enforcement system without
self reports or (explicit) differentiation in inspection rates. The efficiency is increased
as the proposed system ensures an efficient allocation of aggregate catch across firms
and can reduce the inspection costs compared to the traditional enforcement system.
The effectiveness is increased as the self-report based system can reach a wider range
of target aggregate catch levels than the traditional system.
The regulatory situation we address is one where there are significant problems of
non-compliance with quotas. In addition, the punishment for quota violations as well
as the inspection budget are constrained. Under the traditional enforcement system,
once the constraints are binding further quota reductions are ineffective, as they cannot
be enforced (all or most firms violate their quotas). In some fisheries, the enforcement
agencies may try to address this issue by targeting inspections on vessels with poorer
compliance histories. However, whether this increases or decreases enforcement ef-
fectiveness depends on the cost structure of the regulated fishing industry, but the
allocative efficiency will in any event be reduced.
Instead we suggest an explicit and well-defined differentiation of inspection rates
contingent on correct self reporting of quota violations. Rather than targeting inspec-
tions on firms that the control agency perceives as more reactive to expected fines (i.e.,
more likely to violate quotas), our proposed differentiation system introduces the threat
of a “control hell” to all firms. Any firm that is detected violating its quota without
having correctly reported this will face higher inspection rates than other firms for a
given period of time. This threat strengthens the violation deterrence. Furthermore,
by relying on self selection through the self-reporting component, our system can in-
crease the effectiveness of inspections without prior information about individual firms’
responsiveness to incentives.
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The analysis of our reformed quota enforcement system implies a shift in focus away
from inducing quota compliance per se, toward inducing correct self reports of catches
in excess of quotas. Correct self reporting increases the allocative efficiency compared
to quota compliance. This is why the increase in effectiveness under our reform of the
enforcement system can be achieved without reducing the allocative efficiency.
Under the self-report based enforcement system, firms that exceed their quotas
and self report pay a fixed fee per unit excess catches. Hence, the self-report based
system resembles a management system with a combination of catch quotas and landing
fees. Furthermore, even though the initial allocation of quotas is not so that the most
efficient firms are allocated more, as long as the firms choose to exceed their quota and
correctly self report, the firms will choose their catch levels so that they all face the
same marginal shadow price of catches. Hence, the aggregate catch will be allocated
efficiently across firms regardless of the initial distribution of quota units.
We presented a numerical example that demonstrates these improvements, as well
as possible limitations of the proposed enforcement system. The main limitation of
the self-report based system is that its ability to increase the range of steady-state
aggregate production targets depends on political constraints, such as the time period
violating firms can be sentenced to spend in the high inspection group.
The focus on ensuring correct self reporting of violations implies a number of other
advantages not captured by our analysis. First, as pointed out by Innes (2001), once
regulated firms correctly self report, they no longer have an incentive to avoid inspec-
tions. In many fisheries there may be significant avoidance opportunities and conse-
quently the costs of avoidance and combating avoidance may be substantial (Anderson
& Lee, 1986; Milliman, 1986). The welfare effect of not incurring such costs may be
substantial, which further increases the relative efficiency of the proposed enforcement
system. A second advantage is in terms of reduced risk for firms. As noted by Kaplow
& Shavell (1994), risk-bearing costs are eliminated under self reporting, which is rel-
evant if fishing firms are risk averse. A third advantage is the possibility of increased
precision in catch and stock estimates when firms report their actual catches. The value
of decreased measurement error depends on the characteristics of the resource, but can
be significant. Hence, in addition to the advantages we have focused on in the paper,
the proposed self-report based enforcement system have several other advantages com-
pared to the traditional enforcement system that further increase the potential welfare
gain.
27
Working Paper No. 25/10
References
Agnew, D., Pearce, J., Pramod, G., Peatman, T., Watson, R., Beddington, J., &
Pitcher, T. (2009). Estimating the worldwide extent of illegal fishing. PLoS ONE,
4(2), e4570.
Anderson, L. & Lee, D. (1986). Optimal governing instrument, operation level, and
enforcement in natural resource regulation: the case of the fishery. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 68(3), 678–690.
Anton, W., Deltas, G., & Khanna, M. (2004). Incentives for environmental self-
regulation and implications for environmental performance. Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management, 48(1), 632–654.
Charles, A. T., Mazany, R. L., & Cross, M. L. (1999). The economics of illegal fishing:
A behavioural model. Marine Resource Ecnomics, 14, 95–110.
Chavez, C. & Salgado, H. (2005). Individual transferable quota markets under illegal
fishing. Environmental and Resource Economics, 31, 303–324.
Greenberg, J. (1984). Avoiding tax avoidance: A(repeated) game-theoretic approach.
Journal of Economic Theory, 32(1), 1–13.
Hamilton, J. T. (1995). Pollution as news: Media and stock market reactions to the
toxics release inventory data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 28(1), 98–113.
Harrington, W. (1988). Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted. Journal
of Public Economics, 37, 29–53.
Helland, E. (1998). The enforcement of pollution control laws: Inspections, violations,
and self-reporting. Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1), 141–153.
Heyes, A. & Rickman, N. (1999). Regulatory dealing – revisiting the [h]arrington
paradox. Journal of Public Economics, 72(3), 361–378.
Innes, R. (1999). Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement. Journal
of Public Economics, 72(3), 379–393.
Innes, R. (2001). Violator avoidance activities and self-reporting in optimal law en-
forcement. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 17(1), 239.
28
Working Paper No. 25/10
Kaplow, L. & Shavell, S. (1994). Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of be-
havior. The Journal of Political Economy, 102(3), 583–606.
Konar, S. & Cohen, M. (1997). Information as regulation: The effect of community
right to know laws on toxic emissions. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 32(1), 109–124.
Livernois, J. & McKenna, C. (1999). Truth or consequences-enforcing pollution stan-
dards with self-reporting. Journal of Public Economics, 71(3), 415–440.
Macho-Stadler, I. & Pe´rez-Castrillo, D. (2006). Optimal enforcement policy and firms’
emissions and compliance with environmental taxes. Journal of Environmental Eco-
nomics and Management, 51(1), 110–131.
Malik, A. (1993). Self-reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic
pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24(3), 241–257.
Milliman, S. (1986). Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 13(4), 363–381.
Russell, C. (1990). Monitoring and enforcement. In P. Portney (Ed.), Public policies
for environmental protection (pp. 243–274). Washington DC.
Sandmo, A. (2000). The public economics of the environment. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Short, J. & Toffel, M. (2008). Coerced confessions: Self-policing in the shadow of the
regulator. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24(1), 45–71.
Sumaila, U. R., Alder, J., & Keith, H. (2006). Global scope and economics of illegal
fishing. Marine Policy, 30, 696–703.
Sutinen, J. G. & Andersen, P. (1985). The economics of fisheries law enforcement.
Land Economics, 61(4), 387–397.
29
Working Paper No. 25/10
APPENDIX
A Deriving aggregate catch levels
A.1 Traditional enforcement system
Profits for compliant and non-compliant firms are given by equations (10) and (4). By
solving the profit maximization problem of the firm for any value of αi, it can be shown
that firm level harvests are:
y∗i =
 min
(
pX
αi
, q
)
for αi ≥ αˆ
X
αi
(p− γf) for αi < αˆ,
(A.1)
where αˆ is the value of the firm specific cost parameter α for which a firm would be
indifferent between compliance and non-compliance.
A.2 Self-report based enforcement system
To calculate aggregate harvest as a function of the self-reporting rebate when firms
choose strategies A and B, we start out by analyzing optimal firm-level behavior.
We calculate optimal individual catches based on the assumption that firms seek to
maximize profits. From the profit function specified above, optimal catches are as
follows:
y∗a =
X
α
(p− rf) (A.2)
y∗b1 =
X
α
(p− γ1f) (A.3)
y∗b2 = q, (A.4)
where subscripts a, b1, and b2 denote a firm choosing strategy A (in group 1), a firm
choosing strategy B currently in group 1, and a firm choosing strategy B currently in
group 2, respectively. By substituting catch response functions from equations (A.2-
A.4) into equation 3 and adjusting for the long-run shares of strategy B firms that are
in groups 1 and 2, an expression for aggregate catch can be found.
We can now calculate the value of α for which a firm is indifferent between strate-
gies A and B, which we denote α0. Strategy B is relatively more attractive to more
productive firms (low αi) because their gains from not self reporting excess catches in
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group 1 are greater than for less productive firms (with high αi). Thus, if some firms
prefer strategy B to strategy A it must be firms with low values of αi.
We now derive the value of α that makes a firm indifferent between strategies A
and B, which we denote α0. The present value of all future payoffs for a firm following
strategy A is:
EVa =
∞∑
t=0
βtpi∗a (αi, X) , (A.5)
which can be rewritten:
EVa =
pi∗a (αi, X)
1− β . (A.6)
Correspondingly, the expected present value of all future payoffs for a firm following
strategy B is:
EVb =
∞∑
t=0
βtpi∗b (αi, X) . (A.7)
This can be rewritten as follows:28
EVb = pi
∗
b1 (αi, X) + (1− γ1)βEVb + γ1
(
u∑
t=0
βtpi∗b2 (αi, X) + β
u+1EVb
)
EVb =
pi∗b1 (αi, X) + γ1
(
u∑
t=0
βtpi∗b2 (αi, X)
)
1− (1− γ1)β − γ1βu+1 . (A.8)
The value of αi that separates firms choosing strategy A from firms choosing strategy B
can be identified by equating the present values of the two strategies (EVa = EVb) and
is denoted α0. We substitute in for the maximized profit functions, pi
∗
a =
X
2α (p− rf)2 +
rfq and pi∗b1 =
X
2α (p− γ1f)2 + γ1fq, and obtain:
X
2α0
(p− rf)2 + rfq
1− β =
X
2α0
(p− γ1f)2 + γ1fq + γ1
u∑
t=0
βt
(
pq − α0q22X
)
1− (1− γ1)β − γβu+1
Rearranging the expression yields the following second order equation in α0:
α20(1− β)γ1
u∑
t=0
(
βtq2
X
)
− 2α0
[
γ1(1− β)
(
fq +
∞∑
t=0
βtpq
)
− rfq (1− (1− γ1)β − γ1βu+1)]
+X (p− rf)2 (1− (1− γ1)β − γ1βu+1)−X (p− γ1f)2 (1− β) = 0
(A.9)
28We assume that firms take the current level of the stock, as well as all policy variables, as given when
considering future operations and profits.
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Solving equation (A.9) gives the following:
α0 =
−B +√B2 − 4AD
2A
, (A.10)
where A , B and D are defined as follows:
A = (1− β)γ1
u∑
t=0
(
βtq2
X
)
,
B = 2
[
rfq
(
1− (1− γ1)β − γ1βu+1
)− γ1(1− β)(fq + ∞∑
t=0
βtpq
)]
,
D = X (p− rf)2 (1− (1− γ1)β − γ1βu+1)−X (p− γ1f)2 (1− β).
Finally, under the assumption that u can be set high enough to ensure that all
firms chose strategy A, we can calculate aggregate catch response function. We use the
reaction function of strategy A firms from equation (A.2). In addition we know the
probability density function of the uniformly distributed variable α, which is 1α¯−α (for
α ≤ α ≤ αˆ). Given that there is a continuum of firms, total catches can be expressed
as:
Y = nX (p− rf) 1
α¯− α
α¯∫
α
1
α
dα (A.11)
By solving the integral and rearranging, the aggregate catch response function becomes:
Y =
nX (p− rf)
α¯− α ln
(
α¯
α
)
. (A.12)
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